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Abstract. With the advent of cloud computing, a number of cloud
providers have arisen to provide Storage-as-a-Service (SaaS) offerings to
both regular consumers and business organizations. SaaS (different than
Software-as-a-Service in this context) refers to an architectural model
in which a cloud provider provides digital storage on their own infras-
tructure. Three models exist amongst SaaS providers for protecting the
confidentiality of data stored in the cloud: 1) no encryption (data is
stored in plain text), 2) server-side encryption (data is encrypted once
uploaded), and 3) client-side encryption (data is encrypted prior to up-
load). Through a combination of a Network and Source Code Analysis,
this paper seeks to identify weaknesses in the third model, as it claims
to offer 100% user data confidentiality throughout all data transactions.
The weaknesses we uncovered primarily center around the fact that the
cloud providers we evaluated (Wuala, Tresorit, and Spider Oak) were
each operating in a Certificate Authority capacity to facilitate data shar-
ing. In this capacity, they assume the role of both certificate issuer and
certificate authorizer as denoted in a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)
scheme - which gives them the ability to view user data contradicting
their claims of 100% data confidentiality. We have collated our analy-
sis and findings in this paper and explore some potential solutions to
address these weaknesses in these sharing methods. The solutions pro-
posed are a combination of best practices associated with the use of PKI
and other cryptographic primitives generally accepted for protecting the
confidentiality of shared information.
1 Introduction
Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access
to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers,
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released
with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud
model promotes availability and is composed of five essential characteristics (On-
demand self-service, Broad network access, Resource pooling, Rapid elasticity,
Measured Service); three service models (Software as a Service, Platform as a
Service, Cloud Infrastructure as a Service); and four deployment models (Private
cloud, Community cloud, Public cloud, Hybrid cloud) [1].
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With the advent of cloud computing, a number of Cloud Storage Providers
(CSPs) have arisen to provide Storage-as-a-Service (SaaS) offerings to both reg-
ular consumers and business organizations. SaaS refers to an architectural model
in which a cloud provider provides digital storage on their own infrastructure [2].
Three models exist amongst SaaS providers for protecting the confidentiality of
data stored in the cloud: 1) no encryption (data is stored in plain text), 2) server-
side encryption (data is encrypted once uploaded), and 3) client-side encryption
(data is encrypted prior to upload). Dropbox is the most popular version of a
cloud storage provider that adheres to the first confidentiality model. In this
paper we examine secure alternatives to Dropbox that provide client-side en-
cryption. Our primary motivation is based on consistent claims made by CSPs
that guarantee the confidentiality of data stored in the cloud. The major claims
are as follows:
– “No one unauthorized not even the cloud storage provider can access the
files.” [3]
– “Our ’zero-knowledge’ privacy environment ensures we can never see your
data. Not our staff. Not government. Not anyone.” [4]
– “Contrary to other solutions, no storage provider or network administrator,
no unauthorized hacker, not even we can read your files.” [5]
These principles of confidentiality hold true in use cases where data is not
shared with other cloud users or with entities outside of the cloud storage envi-
ronment (e.g., non-members). In the evaluated SaaS environments, data sharing
is accomplished in three ways: Web Link, Folder, or Group, the latter two being
the focus of this research. Through our analysis we discovered that for each data
sharing mechanism, there are inherent weaknesses that can expose user data to
the cloud provider which directly contradicts the aforementioned CSP claims.
What would prompt a Cloud Provider to compromise the trust of its users in
this way?
1. National Security: In the interest of National Security, governments will
often collect citizen data for the purposes of confirming a threat. This collec-
tion typically consists of activities such as wire tapping, data harvesting, and
other forms of information collection. Data Harvesting (usually associated
with Cloud-Storage attacks) refers to the collection of disparate data from
a homogeneuous location. This approach is advantageous for a Government
seeking data points from multiple entities such as is the case in a co-resident
Cloud Storage environment.
2. Oppressive Government: Under certain government regimes, there may
exist situations in which a Government might “force” a Cloud Provider to
comply with new or existing disclosure regulations. Reasons for this may
include: 1) Company Sanctions, 2) Periodic Evaluations, or 3) to Limit
Monopoly business practices.
3. Data Leakage Confirmation As is common in the “Networked” world,
data that is accessible via the Internet is subject to data breaches. The Data
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Breach Notification Laws require states to report the occurrence of company
and state-related data breaches. In order to confirm and subsequently comply
with these laws, Cloud Providers could potentially need to access user data
in plain text form.
Our primary contributions are as follows:
– We present an overview of the various sharing scenarios employed by each
evaluated CSP
– We highlight the weaknesses found in each CSP sharing scenario. Our re-
search focus is on exposing the weaknesses in private Group and Folder
sharing scenarios.
– We describe how an attack against private Group or Folder sharing functions
could work in practice.
– We provide evidence of Certificate Authority functionality via network traffic
and source code analysis.
– We reverse engineer various CSPs code to reveal evidence that substantiates
our claims that user data is not 100% safe from being read and/or manipu-
lated by the CSP.
– We provide suggestions for addressing the inherent weaknesses discovered in
the design of the CSP sharing functions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the work related
to our analysis area, Section 3 provides an overview of the CSPs we evaluated and
the sharing scenarios they support, Section 4 discusses the attack and associated
threat model, Section 5 provides a detailed review of our analysis methodology
and associated results, and Sections 6 concludes the paper and provides areas
for future work.
2 Related Work
This section puts our analysis in perspective by examining preceding work that
relates to the analysis of Cloud Storage Providers (CSPs). Prior work falls into
three specific categories: 1) General Analysis of CSP security capabilities, 2)
Analysis of the Design an Implementation of CSPs, and 3) Analysis of the Weak-
nesses associated with CSPs.
In [6], Borgmann and Waidner of the Fraunhofer Institute for Secure In-
formation Technology, studied the security mechanisms of seven Cloud Stor-
age Services: CloudMe, CrashPlan, Dropbox, Mozy, TeamDrive, Ubuntu One,
and Wuala. The study focused on the following security requirements: Registra-
tion and Login, Transport Security, Encryption, Secure File Sharing, and Secure
Deduplication. Similar to our approach, they examine several aspects of the
CSP’s file sharing mechanisms for security flaws. Specifically, they highlight the
fact that if client-side encryption is used, sharing should not weaken the security
level. In particular, the CSP should not be able to read the shared files. The
scope of their work covered sharing with other subscribers of the same service,
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sharing files with a closed group of non-subscribers, and sharing files with ev-
erybody. As we also discovered in our research, sharing via secret web link (e.g.,
closed group of non-subscribers) or making data public reveals shared data to
the CSP. Their analysis, however, did not yield the fact that sharing files with
subscribers could also result in a breach of confidentiality with the CSP due to
the CSP acting in a Certificate Authority (CA) capacity. This is proven in our
analysis and can serve as a viable extension to their work.
Mager et al. in [7] examine the design and implementation of an online backup
and file sharing system called Wuala. The goals of their work consist of four
primary items: Characterization of the Infrastructure, Understanding the Data
Placement Methodology, Identifying the Coding Techniques relating to Data
Availability (accessibility of files at any time) and Durability (ensuring files are
never lost), and the Determination of the Data Transport Protocol used. The
scope of their evaluation does not necessarily include security considerations,
although the data structure employed by Wuala for sharing data is mentioned
as well as the type of encryption used for performing client-side encryption.
Overall, this research provided useful insight into methods employed by the CSP
to facilitate client usage of their infrastructure, however, it does not examine
the infrastructure or design in detail for security weaknesses. As it pertains to
their goals, our work differs in that it looks at the CSP infrastructure security
features for consistency with user expectations. We focus on the data sharing
(not placement) methodology employed by the CSPs. The coding techniques we
identified relate to the discovery of evidence that the CSP is operating in a CA
capacity during sharing transactions.
Finally in [8], Kholia and Wegrzyn analyze the Dropbox cloud-based file
storage service from a security perspective. Their research presents novel tech-
niques to reverse engineer frozen Python applications (to include Dropbox). They
specifically describe a method to bypass Dropbox’s two factor authentication and
hijack Dropbox accounts. Additionally, they introduce generic approaches to in-
tercept SSL data using code injection techniques and monkey patching. This
work is consistent with our analysis of CSPs for major security flaws as it re-
sults in the exposure of private user data and enables the CSP to have access to
shared user data.
3 Cloud Storage Provider Overview
This section provides an overview of the Cloud Storage Providers (CSPs) we
evaluated and the ‘confidentiality model’ they each employ to protect the confi-
dentiality of user data. We define a confidentiality model as the method employed
by the CSP to protect the confidentiality of users’ stored data. According to
[9,10], there are several CSPs that offer client-side encryption. For our analysis,
we focused on Wuala, Spider Oak, and Tresorit. Wuala encryption is performed
with AES256 prior to files being uploaded. Encryption comprehensively includes
not only file content, but also: file names, preview images, folders and metadata.
An RSA2048 key is used for signatures and key exchange when folders are shared
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while SHA-256 is used for data integrity. Spider Oak can be used to share and
back up files. Data is encrypted on a user computer with AES256 in CFB mode
and HMAC-SHA256. As mentioned previously, the company claims to have no
knowledge of what data is stored in their servers or user passwords. Their soft-
ware works in smart phones, the Linux operating system, and Windows [9].
Lastly, Tresorit is a Hungarian-based company that uses AES256 to encrypt
data before uploading it to the cloud. The company is offering $10,000.00 (US)
to anyone who can break their security software. Similar to Spider Oak, data
can be accessed via smart phone or desktop computer. Each CSP’s confiden-
tiality model is discussed in the following subsections. All information in this
section has been adapted from the CSP’s website and/or documentation unless
otherwise specified.
Table 1 summarizes the confidentiality model employed by each CSP based
on each data sharing scenario provided. It also presents an overview of each
sharing scenario according to the level of effort required to ’exploit’ the scenario
(Trivial or Non-Trivial). Our research focuses on the sharing scenarios that the
CSPs highlight as offering 100% data confidentiality (i.e., Private Group and
Private Folder sharing). “N/A” represents a feature that is not implemented or
has no documentation to support the scenario.
Sharing Scenario
Public Private Public Private Public Private
CSP Web Link Web Link Folder Folder Group Group
Wuala Public Private Public Public Key Public Public Key
URL URL Folder Encryption Group Encryption
Spider Oak Public Public URL N/A N/A N/A N/A
URL with Passwd
Tresorit N/A Encrypted N/A RSA N/A ICE
Link or Protocol
TGDH
Difficulty Trivial Trivial Trivial Non-Trivial Trivial Non-Trivial
Table 1. Trivial vs. Non-Trivial Sharing Scenarios
As noted above for all CSPs, when data is shared via Private web link, the
CSP requires the transmission of some sensitive data in order to process the
user’s request. Similarly, each of the Public Sharing Scenarios (i.e., Web Link,
Group, Folder) require implicit trust of the CSP in order to make the data public.
As a result, these scenarios were discussed in this section for completeness but
fall outside of the scope of our research due to this requirement of trust.
6 “To Share or not to Share” in Client-Side Encrypted Clouds
4 Threat Model
In this section we provide a threat model which describes how an attack against
a Cloud Storage Provider (CSP) offering client-side encryption could potentially
be executed. Rating the threats we identify in this section are outside of the
scope of our research. We make the following assumptions with regards to the
threat model:
1. The CSP client is trusted and has not been previously modified by a mali-
cious insider or outsider. In the case of a modified client, users could easily
be redirected to a rogue server upon client startup and be forced to perform
all sharing transactions through this server.
2. The CSP server is trusted and has not been compromised. Similar to the
case of a rogue client, a rogue server would allow an adversary access to user
certificates and gain access to decryption keys.
3. Other CSP members can be trusted. When searching for an individual user
in the CSP database, it is assumed that the users identified are legitimately
who they appear to be.
4. The User certificates issued cannot be trusted because they are issued by
the CSP.
5. Public or Private Web Link Sharing scenarios (as mentioned above) require
users to reveal some form of sensitive information to the CSPs to enable
decryption in a browser environment. Similarly, Public Groups and Folders
are accessible by all members and pose no threats to users.
Our analysis consists primarily of network traffic analysis and reverse-engineering
the source code of each CSP client through decompilation or disassembly. We
selected this course of analysis due to fact that most of the CSP client code
used some form of code obfuscation — making the replication of a rogue client
challenging. Additionally, we could not produce counterfeit certificates ‘on be-
half of’ other users, because we do not possess the signing key of the CSPs we
analyzed. This signing key would be required to produce certificates that CSP
client applications would trust. We discuss below a scenario that would enable
a Cloud Provider to maliciously access a user’s data.
1. User A signs up for Cloud Account
2. User A initiates sharing request with User B
3. Cloud client returns User B’s contact information to User A
4. Cloud Provider substitutes its Public Key for User B
5. Without User A’s knowledge his/her data is encrypted with the Public Key
of the Cloud Provider
6. Cloud Provider is able to decrypt User A’s data and view its contents
7. Cloud Provider then re-encrypts data with User B’s Public Key and Cloud
Client sends sharing request to User B
8. User B decrypts the data sent by User A w/o knowledge of the above-stated
attack.
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This scenario simply show that because the CSPs are operating as Certificate
Authorities, certificate manipulation, spoofing, or substitution of any kind can
be accomplished. It is also important to emphasize that a malicious CSP cannot
be detected since it can perform a standard man-in-the-middle attack in which
the encrypted information flow from the sender is first decrypted and then re-
encrypted on the fly under the recipient’s public key (and vice-versa). In essence,
the CSP is able to spoof the identity of any user through the use of certificates. In
the next section, we show evidence to support our claim that each evaluated CSP
is serving in a CA capacity -– making all users susceptible to the aforementioned
attacks.
5 Analysis Methodology and Results
In this section we provide a detailed review of our analysis results. It is impor-
tant to note that although our results do show that each Cloud Storage Provider
is in some capacity operating as a Certificate Authority (i.e., could issue fake
certificates to its users) - we did not find any evidence to support any claims of
misuse by the Providers themselves (i.e., they are not actively exploiting users
via this attack). Our analysis consisted of three phases examining the sharing
functions employed by each CSP: 1) Network Traffic Analysis (using Wireshark
[12] and Fiddler Web Proxy Debugger [13]), 2) Source Code Decompilation (us-
ing AndroChef Java decompiler [14] and Boomerang C++ decompiler), and 3)
Source Code Disassembly (using HopperApp [15] and Synalyze [16]). Evidence of
CA functionality validates our assertion that when data is shared, it is possible
for the CSP to view user data which contradicts their 100% data confidentially
claims. Evidence of CA functionality includes (but is not limited to the follow-
ing): Certificates (i.e., Root or Intermediary), Certificate Issuance, Certificate
Validation, Certificate Revocation, Certificate Authentication, Certificate Re-
newal, Certificate Registration, Obtaining Certificates, Encryption/Decryption,
and Digital Signature (signing or verification). The processes for performing the
network traffic, source code decompilation, and source code disassembly analyses
are discussed below.
A CA is a Trusted Third Party (TTP) organization or company that issues
digital certificates used to create digital signatures and public-private key pairs.
The role of the CA in this process is to guarantee that the individual granted
the unique certificate is, in fact, who he or she claims to be. CAs are a criti-
cal component in data security and electronic commerce because they guarantee
that the two parties exchanging information are really who they claim to be [17].
Serving as a CA, the CSPs would potentially be able to issue counterfeit certifi-
cates to users – pretending to be a legitimate entity that data is shared with.
The code we identified falls into five categories: 1) Code Libraries, Certificate
Files, Certificate Operations, Keystore Files/Definitions, and Peripheral Cryp-
tographic Functions. Lastly, we focused on disassembling code that could not
be reproduced in its original form through Decompilation. The code samples we
extracted were only those that could potentially represent CA functionality. We
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primarily analyzed the main binary files ( .app, .exe files) associated with each
CSP.
5.1 Wuala Analysis
We started our analysis of Wuala by examining the network traffic that was gen-
erated between the client and server during sharing transactions and extracting
any evidence of CA functionality. Through our analysis, we discovered evidence
of a Wuala CA certificate which was used to confirm the validity of the other
certificates below it in the certificate chain. A root certificate is either an un-
signed public key certificate or a self-signed certificate that identifies the Root
Certificate Authority (CA). It is the top-most certificate of the tree, the private
key of which is used to ”sign” other certificates. All certificates immediately
below the root certificate inherit the trustworthiness of the root certificate [18].
Secondly, during disassembly of the Wuala binaries, we identified multiple
references to a ’WualaCACerts’ file which contains several certificates that the
Wuala client uses during its execution to include the Wuala CA file — mentioned
previously. The reference below is to the bouncy castle (Java Crypto Library)
implementation of a Keystore which also contains individual certificate entries.
The contents of this particular file is discussed in the decompilation section be-
low. Lastly, during the decompilation phase, we discovered that Wuala uses a
combination of Name Obfuscation (e.g., changing method and variable names
while maintaining the functionality). To overcome this, we performed searches
across the entire codebase for files that fit into the aforementioned categories.
The primary results of the Wuala decompilation process yielded the WualaCAC-
erts file. This file contains 4 certificate entries: wualaadminca, wualaserverca,
wualaca, and wualaclientca. Each certificate is named to denote the function it
serves within the operation of the Wuala application (i.e., administrative, client,
server, and CA). Each certificate entry has an ’Extension’ section with an Ob-
jectID and a specification of what the key (within the certificate file is used for).
In each of these, the key is used for Certificate Signing. According to IBM’s
Key usage extensions and extended key Usage page, the Certificate Signing key
usage extension is to be used when the subject public key is used to verify a
signature on certificates. This extension can be used only in CA certificates [19].
We summarize the contents of the Wuala CA certificate below:
Alias name: wualaca, Creation date: Jan 6, 2012
Entry type: trustedCertEntry, Owner: CN=Wuala CA, OU=Wuala,
EMAILADDRESS=cert@wuala.com, Issuer: CN=Wuala CA, OU=Wuala, O=LaCie
EMAILADDRESS=cert@wuala.com, Signature algorithm name: SHA1withRSA
As indicated by the algorithms identified in the certificates as well as the key
usage extension, this certificate is used for creating and verifying digital signa-
tures. However, the same certificates could be issued by Wuala for performing
other PKI-related functions to include both encryption and decryption of user
data or the creation of private groups.
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5.2 Spider Oak Analysis
In the case of Spider Oak, the disassembly of its binary did not yield results to
substantiate our claims, thus we focused primarily on the results of decompilation
and network traffic analysis in this section. During the code analysis of Spider
Oak, we uncovered a ’Public Key’ folder containing DSA files, RSA files, a public
key file, and other crypto-related files. These files were each disassembled and
evaluated for evidentiary purposes. The ‘RSA.pyc’ file is presented below as a
representative sample. It shows a call to (or definition of) a ‘generate’ function
used to generate an RSA public/private key pair programmatically. There is a
similar file for generating a DSA key pair which we excluded. The generation
of certificates in a programmatic function confirms that users are not allowed
to use their own certificates for cryptographic purposes which can allow Spider
Oak to generate certificates ’on behalf’ of legitimate users. As a result, a user
could be tricked into sharing data with Spider Oak instead of the intended user.
db "generate(bits:int, randfunc :callable, progress_func:callable)
Generate an RSA key of length ’bits’, using ’randfunc’ to get
random data and ’progress_func’, if present, to display the
progress of the key generation. l\x02"
Unlike Wuala, Spider Oak does not appear to use any form of code obfuscation.
The files we examined contained the .pyc extension which is the equivalent of
a Java Byte Code file for the Python programming language. To analyze these
files, we had to decompile them to the original Python Source code. Similar to
Wuala, Spider Oak uses a file called ‘certs.pyc’ to store its certificates. This file
contained 5 certificate entries: Equifax Secure CA, GeoTrust Global CA (2),
RapidSSL CA, and the Spider Oak Root CA. Contents of the Spider Oak Root
CA certificate are as follows:
Data: Version: 1 (0x0), Serial Number: ea:14:d7:ad:6a:cf:dc:35
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: emailAddress=ssl@spideroak.com, organizationName=SpiderOak
This analysis phase revealed a self-signed root certificate from Spider Oak. A
self-signed certificate is an identity certificate that is signed by the same identity
it certifies. As mentioned above, a typical PKI scheme requires certificates to
be signed by a Trusted Third Party (TTP) for verification purposes. Self-signed
certificates cannot (by nature) be revoked, which may allow an attacker who has
already gained access to monitor and inject data into a connection to spoof an
identity if a private key has been compromised [20]. In this case, the attacker
could potentially be Spider Oak (e.g., spoofing the identity of another user and
gaining access to user data).
Lastly, examining the network traffic between the Spider Oak client and
server produced the same root certificate identified during Decompilation. As a
root certifier, Spider Oak is also responsible for validating any certificate in its
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trusted certificate chain – to include Spider Oak client certificates issued to users.
Finding this type of certificate also demonstrates the fact that as a certificate
issuer, Spider Oak can issue user certificates that spoof the identity of another
user resulting in a data confidentiality breach when data is shared with another
Spider Oak user. Similar to the Wuala example (discussed above), the Spider
Oak Client certificate is also validated by its respective Spider Oak Root CA.
In a recent article, Eric Snowden urges consumers to adopt more secure file
storage systems which are less susceptible to government surveillance - mention-
ing Spider Oak specicially [21]. However, he fails to disclose (or realize) the fact
that data confidentiality could be breached if data is shared (as shown above)
within these same environments. Additionally, Spider Oak was interviewed by
Senior Writer Brian Butler of Network World concerning some of our findings
[22]. The company claims that the features we evaluated fall outside of the scope
of features that they have implemented [23], however, we assert that in order to
share encrypted data - some form of Public Key Encryption must be used. As a
result, Spider Oak users are still subject to this type of flaw.
5.3 Tresorit Analysis
During the Decompilation of Tresorit, we did not identify any independent cer-
tificate files as was the case with Wuala and Spider Oak. According to Tresorit’s
documentation, a roaming profile file contains both the SSL/TLS client certifi-
cate and the associated private key required to communicate with Tresorit’s
servers, and agreement certificates and private keys to securely access and de-
crypt the contents of a Tresor. Hence, there were not any specific certificate
entries to examine during this phase.
Disassembly of the Tresorit binary contained a number of references to cer-
tificate operations, files, and uses with application. The entry below shows the
loading of a certificate in the traditional X.509 format. This confirms that X.509
certifications are utilized in the Tresorit client application for cryptographic func-
tions, however, does not fully substantiate the fact that Tresorit is operating in
a Certificate Authority (CA) capacity.
db "y_OBJ", 0, db "X509_get_pubkey_parameters", 0
db "X509_load_cert_crl_file", 0, db "X509_load_cert_file", 0
db "X509_load_crl_file", 0
In the network analysis of Tresorit, we identified a certificate issued by Tresorit
— the Tresorit User CA certificate. This certificate differs from the Wuala and
Spider Oak certificates in that it is validated by the StartCom CA which would
imply that they are using a TTP to ensure 100% data confidentiality during
sharing transactions. However, the fact that this certificate was issued by Tre-
sorit verifies that they also can view user data whenever the keys are used for
encryption/decryption purposes. Additionally, the fact that users are neither
allowed to use their own certificates or enter credentials to generate their own
certificates upon signing up with any of the three CSPs gives credence to our
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claims that counterfeit certificates could be issued. This would lead users to im-
plicitly trust that other users are who they say they are (i.e., the CSP is not
acting on their behalf). In the case of Tresorit, StartCom CA is serving as the
Root CA with Tresorit serving as an Intermediate CA. This differs from both
Wuala and Tresorit, however, is still indicative of Tresorit operating as a CA in
some capacity.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we examined three major Cloud Storage Providers (CSPs) for
weaknesses associated with their sharing functions. Each CSP claims to offer
100% user data confidentiality through all data transactions executed within
their respective cloud instances. We discovered that these principles of confiden-
tiality hold true in use cases where data is not shared with other cloud users
or with entities outside of the cloud storage environment (e.g., non-members).
We presented several scenarios in which data confidentiality could be breached
to include: when data is shared via Public Web Link, when data is shared via
Private Web Link, when CSP is accessed via Web Browser (i.e., web access), and
when data is shared via Group or Private folder (due to the CSP being the is-
suer of the certificates used for cryptographic operations – hence could allocate
counterfeit certificates to users). We provide evidence in the form of Network
Traffic and Source Code analysis for each CSP to substantiate these claims.
To address the weaknesses discussed in the previous sections, users should
be issued standard certificates via a Trusted Third Party which is typical in
a traditional Public/Private Key implementation or should be allowed to use
their own certificates (e.g., PGP). Alternatively, out-of-band verification mech-
anisms should be used such as those provided by several implementations of
off-the-record (OTR) messaging [21]. Similarly, Tresorit makes use of ICE — a
proprietary protocol that is designed to work in a semi-trusted environment. It
does not rely solely on the trustworthiness of the certificate authority issuing the
users’ certificates, but also an invitation secret and optional pairing password.
Lastly, to enhance the security associated with sharing data via Private Web
Link, it is possible to require password authentication prior to listing shared
files. Spider Oak employs such a strategy, although the CSP would still be re-
quired to verify that the password was entered correctly. In the future, we plan
to extend this work by examining alternative methods of secure file sharing that
do not rely on a CA for identity-verification - which will consequently overcome
a number of weaknesses we have identified in this research.
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